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HAUERWAS ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
John H. Garvey*
Stanley Hauerwas has argued that freedom of religion is not a
good or intelligible moral policy. He has tried to illustrate the point
by reference to some of Stanley Fish's ideas about freedom of
speech. This is a complicated argument, and I think (in case I have
misunderstood him) that I had best begin with a recapitulation. I
will then mention three problems that I have with his argument.
Professor Hauerwas offers us two different ways of looking at the
relation between religion and the state.' One is the view which he
attributes to George Will and Thomas Jefferson. These people see
the relation between Christianity and democracy as a cooperative
one. Hauerwas has this view as his target when he criticizes freedom
of religion. The second view, which Hauerwas himself holds, sees
church-state relations as antagonistic.
Let me sharpen the distinction between these two views by drawing, as Hauerwas does, on an analogy to freedom of speech. First
Amendment theorists have offered us two different ways of looking
at the relation between speech and politics. One is the "town meeting" paradigm. It holds that speech is important because the people,
who are sovereign in our system of government, need to be well informed. Freedom of speech is like the Speech or Debate Clause writ
large. When the people are deliberating about issues of public policy, they should be allowed, as members of Congress are, to speak
their minds in an uninhibited way.
The second view about the relation between speech and politics is
the "checking value" paradigm. It begins with the opposite assumption: there is a distinction between the rulers and the ruled, and
freedom of speech is designed to protect criticism of the rulers. The
ideal speaker in this paradigm is not the citizen at a town meeting
but a critical and independent press. We cannot trust the govern* Ashland Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.
1. Stanley Hauerwas & Michael Baxter, C.S.C., The Kingship of Christ: Why Freedom of
"Belief' Is Not Enough, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 107 (1992).
2. Id. at 109.
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ment to regulate speech because it is, as it were, the enemy; the
press represents the people.
I think that Hauerwas makes a distinction very much like this in
his discussion of religion. The first view (the one he attributes to
Will and Jefferson) holds that religion can play a role in democracy.
Here the people are sovereign, religion is a contribution to the political debate, and we ought to attend to religious claims just as we do
to other points of view. Religion is important in the same way as
other kinds of speech are important, and to ignore it is undemocratic. But the role of religion under this view is limited to weightless verbal exchange.
Hauerwas really dislikes this view for a number of reasons. One is
that in order to process Christian ideals for mass consumption we
have to water them down. "Love your enemy" does not really mean
"love your enemy," it means "do the best you can under the circumstances." Another is that the Christian lobby can be co-opted by
government leaders who want support and guidance. We know this
is happening when we see religious groups celebrating the Gulf
War. Notice that this kind of Christianity is easy to live with. We
can give it religious freedom and not worry about the consequences.
(Here Hauerwas refers to Stanley Fish, who says the same thing
about freedom of speech: all kinds of speech are important, all
speakers should be free, but only if speech doesn't really matter.')
Hauerwas then offers us a second way of looking at religion,
which is like the "checking value" of speech. Here the government
is the enemy, and the ideal religious actor is a critical and independent church. Its function, like the function of the press, is to take
shots at the government.
Hauerwas says he is not interested in constitutional matters, but
if he were, you can see that he would favor separation between religion and government. In most cases he would vote with Justice
Brennan, though his reasons would be those of Pius XI. Hauerwas
would say, for example, that the government should not write
prayers (like the Regents' prayer) for use in the public schools, nor
should it build cr(ches with public funds, because it dilutes Christian ideals when it packages them for mass consumption. It treats
Jesus like Santa Claus; they both become tools of the chamber of
commerce, used to help the downtown merchants sell goods.
3. Id. at 111-13.
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I do not know his feelings about parochial school aid, but I would
guess that he agrees with the result in Aguilar v. Felton," again for
reasons that Pius XI would find congenial. Government aid to parochial schools is bad, and the reason is that the government makes
parochial schools take crucifixes out of the classrooms in order to
get the money. There is an analogy to this in free speech law. It is
that artists should watch out for grants from the National Endowment for the Arts because they will have to make politically correct
(I should say "politically incorrect") art in order to get the money.
The First Amendment envisions a critical and independent press,
not the Federal Register or Stars and Stripes. Conditional grants
undermine the freedom of speech.
Professor Hauerwas would also vote with Justice Brennan in free
exercise cases. Brennan dissented in Employment Division v.
Smith,' and Hauerwas criticizes the decision. This is hardly surprising. The checking value sees First Amendment actors as critics of
the government. The last thing we should do, if we subscribe to this
view, is to let the government regulate its critics.
This, then, is what I understand Professor Hauerwas to be saying.
I will now mention a few problems I have with it. The first problem
is that the analogy between the church and the press - the idea
that each one has a checking value - is incomplete. Churches
aren't just like the press, because churches have members. It's fine
to say, as I once heard Professor Hauerwas say, that the Episcopal
Church ought to excommunicate George Bush. Maybe it ought to.
But what direction does his institutional analogy offer individual
Episcopalians? Hauerwas takes the pastor's point of view. (This is
natural. I take the lawyer's point of view.) But what about his flock?
There are millions of members in his church, and millions and millions of members in mine, and how should they behave? They can't
always and only regard the government as the enemy. Surely
Hauerwas doesn't mean to suggest that they should not vote or hold
public office. And if they do, how would he have them behave?
When I speak about abortion, must I speak in religious terms rather
than in some other language? If I am in the Boston Archdiocese,
must I vote the Catholic Church's position on pro-abortion candidates? Pius XI would say that I should. Would Professor
Hauerwas? Or if I am the governor of Kentucky and my church
4. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
5. 494 U.S. 872, 907 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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condemns the death penalty, must I pardon all capital offenders and
give as my reason the fact that my church condemns the death
penalty?
My first problem, then, is that Hauerwas's paradigm does not
work as well for members as it does for churches. My second problem with the church-press analogy has to do with the intrinsic values of what they are saying. Free speech theory holds that we
should protect the press no matter what it says. The important thing
is that it should oppose the government. The press is like a weather
vane: the wind can come from 360 points on the compass, and the
press should always face into the wind. Well, Professor Hauerwas's
church is not like the press in that respect. If it is true to its principles it will always face in the same direction. So what should the
church do when the wind is at its back? It is too easy to say that the
church should always reject the government's help because the government always waters down true religion. What if the government
sincerely promoted precisely the same practices as Professor
Hauerwas's church?
When I was a young man in the Pennsylvania public schools, the
government had us recite the Lord's Prayer at the beginning of each
day. I'm sure Professor Hauerwas recites this prayer; his church approves of it. Of course he would not force other people to say it.
Jews naturally worried about this in my town. Actually the
Catholics did too; they would drop out when the class got to the part
about "for thine is the kingdom and the power and the glory ....
It got a bit complicated, but we had three factions and everybody
knew where he stood: Protestants went all the way; Catholics
stopped after "deliver us from evil"; Jews kept silent throughout.
But nobody was forced to do anything. The Supreme Court nevertheless held the practice unconstitutional.' But if Professor
Hauerwas means what he says about Pius XI and the Feast of
Christ the King, he should approve of the practice. It coincides with
his religious beliefs; here the wind is at his back. The same will be
true in lots of other cases: rules in favor of monogamy, rules against
homosexuality, rules against funding abortions, repeal of the death
penalty. The press checks the government by opposing all of these
rules. But the church agrees with the rules. If it is true to its principies, it should promote and support them. That is what Pius XI
6. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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wanted.
My third problem is related to the second one. Churches (unlike
the press) have fixed points of view, but they don't all have the same
views. Hauerwas has proposed a way for Christians, or maybe just
for Methodists, to look at the relation between church and state. He
says, in effect, "This is my view. My church stands for these principles, so it ought to promote them (as Pius XI said). We should
above all else be true to our own ideals. In arranging the affairs of
religion and government, we should be guided by them." But if this
works for Professor Hauerwas, then it cannot work for me, because
after a certain point my church does not believe what his church
believes. Of course he has to think that my church is wrong about
this. And I think that his church is wrong. In fact I know it is. But
the point is that his theory won't help to solve our political problems
until everyone becomes a Methodist. And that is not likely to happen soon.

